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A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE UNIQUE ETHICAL
DYNAMIC OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
CO-COUNSEL RELATIONS IN COURT-MARTIAL
DEFENSE
Robert E. Murdough*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Captain ("CPT") Andrew Hampton rubs his eyes. 1 He is not
looking forward to his next appointment. Along with his co-counsel,
CPT Clara Franklin, CPT Hampton has been diligently trying to prepare
for Sergeant ("SGT") Tyler Jackson's court-martial. SGT Jackson stands
accused of two specifications of sexual assault,2 to which he has
steadfastly maintained his innocence. His detailed military defense
counsel ("MDC"), CPT Hampton and CPT Franklin, believe there are
some flaws in the prosecution's case, but their client is continually
unwilling or unable to answer straightforward questions, complicating
their trial preparation. As a result, the relationship has become strained.
When SGT Jackson arrives, he walks into the office with a small grin on
his face. "Hey, sir," he says, "You should know I hired Joe Smith."
CPT Hampton winces. Joe Smith is a civilian lawyer with a
slick-looking website and an office within walking distance of the post's
main gate. He brags, publicly and often, about his past military service
and his courtroom prowess. Soldiers apparently believe him enough to
keep him in business, but the defense attorneys in the local field office of

* Major, United States Army. The opinions expressed in this Article are solely the author's
in his personal capacity and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense,
Department of the Army, or any organization or official thereof. The author thanks Lieutenant
Colonel Aimee Bateman and Michael Millios, Esq. for their help in proofreading this Article and
recommending edits.
1. The hypothetical scenario presented is not based on any particular case or cases but drawn
in general from the author's personal experience and observations as a supervisory defense counsel
in the United States Army Trial Defense Service. All of the names are fictitious, and any
resemblance to any particularindividual is entirely coincidental.
2. Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920.

111

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

112

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:111

the trial defense service' have a decidedly different opinion, and they all
dread working with him. With trepidation, CPT Hampton and CPT
Franklin meet with Mr. Smith and SGT Jackson to plan their strategy
going forward. At the meeting, Mr. Smith assures SGT Jackson how
hard he will fight. CPT Hampton provides Mr. Smith a copy of the
400-page casefile, which Mr. Smith sticks in a briefcase. The attorneys
draft a plan to divide the workload among the three of them; both CPT
Hampton and CPT Franklin know that three defense lawyers are too
many for this case.
Over the next few weeks, CPT Hampton grows more concerned.
The military judge grants a continuance to allow Mr. Smith time to
prepare. But after filing his notice of appearance, Mr. Smith does not
respond to phone calls or emails, either from his co-counsel or the
military judge. As deadlines approach, CPT Hampton seeks guidance
and input from Mr. Smith; however, with no answers from Mr. Smith,
CPT Hampton eventually responds on behalf of the defense to every
request and direction from the judge. He and CPT Franklin file all the
defense motions-with SGT Jackson's verbal consent on the recordand Mr. Smith is absent from oral arguments. Behind the scenes, SGT
Jackson grows increasingly agitated as trial gets closer. Finally, Mr.
Smith sets a meeting in his office to go over the case the Friday before
trial. During the meeting, it is clear that Mr. Smith has not interviewed
any of the witnesses he said he would, is still unaware of several
significant details, and has not developed a consistent theory of the case.
Although Mr. Smith did little preparation, as lead counsel, he
personally handles the most critical elements of the trial. The defense
case begins with Mr. Smith's confusing opening statement. His
off-the-cuff cross-examination of the alleged victim creates several
3. The United States Army Trial Defense Service is an independent field operating agency
that provides defense counsel services to the United States Army. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGUL.
27-10, MIL. JUST. ch. 6 (May 11, 2016) [hereinafter AR 27-10]. In the Air Force, the Trial Defense
Division performs the same function. U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-204, U.S. AIR
FORCE JUDICIARY AND AIR FORCE TRIAL JUDICIARY para. 2.2.3 (Sept. 10, 2018). Within the
Department of the Navy, the United States Navy Defense Service Offices and United States Marine
Corps Defense Service Organization provide defense counsel support to their respective services.
U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, NAVAL LEGAL SERVS. COMMAND INSTRUCTION 5800.1G, NAVAL LEGAL
SERVS. COMMAND MANUAL ch. 11 (Feb. 25, 2013); U.S. MARINE CORPS, ORD. 5800.16, 3 LEGAL
SUPPORT ADMIN. MANUAL (Feb. 20, 2018) [hereinafter MCO 5800.16-V3]. The United States
Navy Defense Service Offices also support the United States Coast Guard. See Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Deputy J. Adv. Gen., U.S. Coast Guard, and the Commander, Naval
Legal Serv. Command, Regarding Mutual Support in Military Justice Matters (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Headquarters/Lega/mj/MJ Docs/Chapter%201 2%20Reference%20
see also CG Defense
-%20CG%20-%20Navy%20MOU%20for%20Defense%20Support.pdf;
Services, U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.uscg.mil/Resources/legal/LMA/Defense-Counsel (last
visited Nov. 7, 2020). Collectively, this Article further refers to these organizations of military
defense counsel ("MDC"), roughly analogous to civilian public defenders' offices, as "military trial
defense organizations."
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openings for the prosecutors to exploit, which they do devastatingly
well. He stumbles through a closing argument that misstates key
evidence, drawing two sustained "facts not in evidence" objections. The
verdict takes just under two hours. By the end of the day, SGT Jackson
is a convicted sex offender with a dishonorable discharge starting a
ten-year prison term. With tears in his eyes, SGT Jackson asks CPT
Hamilton, "What happened?"
CPT Hamilton wants to reply, "You hired Mr. Smith," but instead
he mumbles an apology and promises to stay in touch during the
post-trial process.
The military justice system is unique in that every servicemember
tried at a court-martial is entitled to a defense lawyer detailed to
represent him at government expense, 4 whereas civilian jurisdictions
provide a government-funded lawyer only to those criminal defendants5
who cannot afford to pay for their own defense counsel.6 Under Article
38 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), servicemembers
facing trial by court-martial may be represented by MDC detailed at
government expense, by military counsel of their own selection if
"reasonably available," or by civilian counsel obtained at no expense to
the government.7 The first and last of these rights are not exclusive;
unless the accused affirmatively releases her detailed MDC, that MDC
remains assigned to the defense team even after the accused hires a
civilian defense counsel ("CDC").' This creates a unique dynamic on a
court-martial defense team, where the accused retains both the
government-funded counsel that someone else chose for her and the
retained counsel of her choice. The military is the only jurisdiction
where such a forced co-counsel relationship is possible.' This dynamic
presents an acute ethical dilemma for an MDC: What is his obligation to
his client when it appears that the CDC is failing to perform the
responsibilities for which the client retained him?
Most CDC, like most attorneys in general, understand their
professional responsibilities to their clients, and most relations between

4. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827.
5. The UCMJ and the Rules for Courts-Martial use the term "the accused" rather than the
"the defendant," which is the term typically used in civilian jurisdictions. Similarly, whereas
civilian public defenders are commonly "appointed" to represent a client, MDC are "detailed." In
order to maintain consistency with the authorities cited herein, this Article follows these
conventions. UCMJ art. 1, 10 U.S.C. § 801.
6. Cf Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (stating that "[t]he right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours").
7. UCMJ art. 38, 10 U.S.C. § 838.
8. Id.
9. See id.; cf Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (recognizing that "any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him").
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military and civilian defense attorneys are civil and effective. But some
MDC find themselves unwilling members of a defense team that
approaches constitutionally ineffective assistance. 10 Under the current
laws and policies concerning forming and terminating attorney-client
relationships, an MDC may find himself forced to work under a CDC"
who not only disagrees with the MDC's views of the case, but whose
conduct actively harms the client. This places the MDC in a difficult
position that the military's ethical rules and service policies do not
adequately address. In practice, an MDC is expected to compensate for a
CDC's shortcomings and carry the workload themselves if necessary;
this perpetuates the problem by masking it. Furthermore, the statutory
and regulatory system by which MDC form and terminate
attorney-client relationships exacerbates this method of accommodation.
The military justice system puts its uniformed MDC in this
position, and therefore, the military services should provide their MDC
with more comprehensive ethical standards and guidelines to include
explicitly permitting, if not directing, MDC to share concerns about a
CDC's performance with their client. Congress and the President should
reform Article 38 and its implementing regulations to ensure CDC
cannot assume that MDC will shore up their inadequate performance.12
Addressing these unique ethical problems will better serve defense
counsel and more importantly will enhance the military justice system's
ability to provide competent representation, and thus a fair trial, for the
accused.
II. MILITARY DEFENSE LAWYERS NEED CLEARER POLICY GUIDANCE
TO ESCAPE THE ETHICAL VICE OF AN INCOMPETENT OR INDILIGENT

CDC
Every accused servicemember facing a court-martial has the right
to representation by a civilian attorney at no expense to the
government.13 Unlike in civilian criminal defense, when a client retains
private (civilian) counsel, her government-funded MDC will remain on
the case as "associate counsel" unless the client excuses her.14 The
selection of a CDC is personal to the accused; the military services vary

10. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing the constitutional
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel).
11. If a servicemember hires a civilian defense counsel ("CDC"), the CDC serves as lead
counsel while the detailed or individually-requested MDC, if obtained, becomes the "associate"
defense counsel, unless excused from the case. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
R.C.M. 502(d)(2)(A) discussion (2019) [hereinafter MCM].
12.

See supra Part III.

13. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 11; see also infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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in the degree to which they restrict the MDC from advising the client on
whether to hire a CDC or recommend a particular CDC.15
The MDC and CDC who represent servicemembers at
courts-martial must be licensed to practice law in at least one territory, a
federal court, or the highest court of a U.S. state.1 6 Furthermore, each
military department promulgates rules of professional conduct, generally
modeled after the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 17 All attorneys, military and civilian, who appear
before a court-martial must comply with the rules for that particular
military service. 18 Therefore, CDC and MDC alike are subject to the
ethical rules of both their licensing authorities and the military
department in which they try cases.
Authorities in at least two jurisdictions have held that attorneys
have a duty to inform their clients directly when they reasonably believe
their co-counsel's performance could constitute malpractice. 19
Additionally, the Army and the Navy explicitly direct military attorneys
to discuss with their clients when they believe a CDC's actions violate
the rules of professional conduct. 20 This is fairly straightforward
regarding the exceedingly rare CDC who, for example, knowingly
presents false evidence 2I or unlawfully destroys documents with
potential evidentiary value. 22 But adherence to this policy presents a
15. Compare AR 27-10, supra note 3, app. C, para. C-2(b)(1) ("Military counsel will not
recommend any specific civilian counsel."), with MCO 5800.16-v3, supra note 3, § 011801
("[Defense Service Organization] attorneys are obligated to honestly answer any and all questions
posed to them by their clients, but will typically avoid recommending to a client which attorney

among a group of two or more the client should select."); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702(c) (2019)
(prohibiting federal employees from endorsing private business enterprises).
16. UCMJ art. 27(b)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b)(1); MCM, supra note 11, R.C.M. 502(d)(2)(B).
17. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGUL. 27-26, RULES PRO. CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS
(June 28, 2018) [hereinafter AR 27-26], and U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.
INSTRUCTION 5803.1E, PRO. CONDUCT ATT'YS PRACTICING UNDER COGNIZANCE AND

SUPERVISION JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. (Jan. 20, 2015) [hereinafter JAGINST 5803.1E], and U.S. DEP'T
OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-110, PRO. RESP. PROGRAM attach. 2 (Dec. 11, 2018) [hereinafter
AFI 51-110], with MODEL RULES PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).

18. AR 27-26, supra note 17, para. 7.a(1); JAGINST 5803.lE, supra note 17, para. 4; AFI
51-100, supra note 17, attach. 2, intro.
19. Curb Records v. Adams & Reese, L.L.P., No. 98-31360, 1999 WL 1240800, at *1 (5th
Cir. Nov. 29, 1999) (per curiam) ("[U]nder Louisiana law, there is an inherent and nondelegable
duty of care that requires local counsel to inform its client of any known malfeasance or
misfeasance on the part of lead counsel, which, to an objective reasonable attorney, would result in

serious prejudice to the client's interests."); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 1092
(2016) ("A lawyer must disclose to the client information that the lawyer reasonably believes
reveals that another lawyer, also representing the client, has committed a significant error or

omission that may give rise to a malpractice claim.").
20. AR 27-10, supra note 3, app. C, para. C-2(b)(3); JAGJNST 5803.1E, supra note 17, encl.
4, para. 3. Both services direct the military attorney to first attempt to resolve the issue directly with

the CDC and to seek to withdraw from the case if the client endorses the CDC's conduct.
21. AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 3.3(a)(3); accord JAGINST 5803.1E, supra note 17,
encl. 1, r. 3.3(a)(3); AFI 51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r. 3.3(a)(3).
22. AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 3.4(a); accord JAGINST 5803.1E, supra note 17,
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greater quandary when applied to more subjective standards like
competence2 3 and diligence. 4
As the defense team readies itself for trial, the point at which
co-counsel's lack of preparation becomes professionally irresponsible is
not easily identified except in hindsight. The military directs the MDC to
25
But the
consult with their supervisory attorneys in these instances.
no
additional
have
supervisory attorneys, while more experienced,
policy guidance to help address the crucial question of when the client
must be informed that the CDC's demonstrated lack of competence or
diligence is harming her interests. It is difficult in the best of
circumstances for an attorney to realize, in advance of trial, that his
co-counsel is going to be ineffective. Yet keeping silent does not aid the
26
client in making informed decisions about her representation, may
harm her interests, and could place the MDC in contravention of both
service policy and his licensing authority.2
The military trial defense organizations have adopted various best
28
practices and common techniques to address this situation. These
typically include maintaining written records of trial preparation and
concerns with the CDC, but these organizations also caution the MDC
that they must be ready to grit their teeth and do all of the work
themselves. 29 This is primarily because military appellate courts evaluate
encl. 1, r. 3.4(a)(1); AFI 51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r. 3.4(a).
23. AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 1.1 ("Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.");
accord JAGINST 5803.1E, supra note 17, encl. 2, r. 1.1; AFI 51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r.
1.1.
24. AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client."); accord JAGINST 5803.1E, supranote 17, encl. 1, r. 1.3; AFI
51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r. 1.3.
25. See, e.g., JAGINST 5803.1E, supra note 17, encl. 4, para. 3; E-mail from Eric B.
Neuman, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Off. Chief Def. Couns., Def. Couns. Assistance Program, to
Robert E. Murdough, Major, U.S. Army (Dec. 6, 2019, 12:15 PM) (on file with author) ("If [M]DCs
are having issues that aren't covered by policy [including concerns over the CDC's preparation],
they are told to contact their supervisor or [the Defense Counsel Assistance Program].").
26. See Curb Records v. Adams & Reese, L.L.P., No. 98-31360, 1999 WL 1240800, at *5
(5th Cir. Nov. 29, 1999) (per curiam) (quoting LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4 (2018)).
27. See supranotes 19-20 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
29. See Major Michael G. Botelho, Working with Civilian Counsel: A MilitaryPractitioner's
Roadmap, ARMY LAW., May 2016, at 23, 29 n.74 (citations omitted) (quoting "former Trial
Defense Services Attorney") ("The defense counsel may not promote nor denigrate the abilities of a
particular attorney, and may not communicate their personal feelings about the retained civilian
counsel to the client."); id. at 28 n.67, 24 n. 11 (quoting a survey of sixty-two anonymous MDC and
CDC) ("I have seen civilian attorneys essentially take the money and dump the work on Trial
Defense Services' (TDS) attorneys ... The best the TDS attorney can do is work the case."); id. at
30 n.92 ("Worst case, the TDS attorneys should simply prepare as if the civilian counsel isn't a
member of the team-an extreme solution, but one that happens."); see also e-mail from Timothy
Grammel, Esq., U.S. Army, Trial Def. Servs. Def. Couns. Assistance Program, to Robert E.
Murdough, Major, U.S. Army (Nov. 22, 2019, 3:35 PM) (on file with author) ("[B]e ready to do
everything in the case until you get some assurances that the CDC is actually prepared to perform
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") by examining the
performance of the defense team as a whole.3 0 Thus military trial
defense organizations, not unreasonably, focus on ensuring their own
members' effectiveness regardless of the performance of a CDC. These
organizations acknowledge that there are times when the MDC must
(tactfully) discuss issues concerning lack of preparation or lack of
communication with her client.31
Yet many additional considerations militate against taking the bold
step of informing the client about a CDC's potentially ineffective
performance. MDC start from a position of deference to the CDC,` and
most will want to retain a civil working relationship while they share a
client. An MDC may not want to upset his client, who is already under
significant strain and is paying for the CDC's services. More
significantly, some MDC are wary of accusations of tortious interference
with the attorney-client relationship. 33 An accused servicemember whose
MDC explains to her that her CDC is not performing his duties might
infer that the MDC recommends terminating the relationship with the
CDC. The CDC could very well consider this improper interference with
his own attorney-client relationship.34 Unlike a traditional co-counsel
his tasks."); E-mail from Stuart T. Kirkby, Commander, Dir., U.S. Navy Def. Couns. Assistance
Program, to Robert E. Murdough, Major, U.S. Army (Dec. 20, 2019, 10:54 AM) (on file with
author) ("[W]e encourage written communications and written affirmation of conversations.").
30. United States v. Boone, 42 M.J. 308, 313 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (citing United States v. Walker,
45 C.M.R. 150, 154 (C.M.A. 1972)); see also infra note 54 (discussing a lower court's opinion on
remand evaluating the defense's collective performance).
31. See Grammel, supra note 29 ("If the CDC will not return your calls or e-mails, and you
hear nothing about motions

and witness

requests . .

talk to the client and see if he is

communicating with the CDC. Do this in a way that does not alarm the client.... If the matter is
one of the client's decisions or bears on one of the client's decisions, you should take the matter to

the client."); Kirkby, supra note 29 ("[W]hen communications break down, either over strategy or
through lack of response . . we encourage military counsel to involve the client."); Botelho, supra
note 29, at 29 ("[D]ocument those concerns in a memorandum for record and discuss those concerns
with civilian counsel. If a disagreement regarding competence to practice still exists, the military
counsel should inform civilian counsel of the intent to discuss those concerns with their client.").
32. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
33. In the author's professional experience, this is the overwhelming reason an MDC is
reticent to express his concerns about a CDC's performance to his clients and why better service
policy is necessary. But see Kirkby, supra note 29 ("[The United States Navy's Defense Counsel
Assistance Program] do[es] not see this as interfering with the contractual relationship between the
client and the civilian counsel.").
34. See, e.g., Abrams & Fox, Inc. v. Briney, 114 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1974) ("General
principles regarding tortious interference with contractual relations are applicable to interference
with attorney-client relations."); Callis v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 686 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) ("Illinois recognizes a cause of action for interference with the professional relationship
between attorney and client. This tortious interference claim is based upon interferes with the
attorney-client relationship irrespective of contract." (citation omitted)); Gorayeb & Assocs., P.C.,
v. Toledo, No. 656590/2017, 2018 WL 2739432, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 7, 2018) (holding that
persuading a client to discharge retained attorneys constitutes tortious interference with prospective
economic

relations); see also

Brant Young,

Note,

Inducing a Breach of Attorney-Client

Relationship, 2 U. ALA. J. LEGAL PRO. 203, 209-10 (1977) (noting that lawyers who induce a breach
of the attorney-client relationship can be liable both in tort and to their professional licensing
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relationship in civilian court, a CDC and an MDC probably did not
choose to work with each other. Thus, a CDC would likely be less
reticent about leveling an accusation, either as a tort suit or a bar
complaint, than among co-counsel who chose to associate. This lack of
coupled with basic human pride, also makes
familiarity,
misunderstandings more likely-while the MDC and CDC may both
believe they are acting appropriately, they misinterpret the other's
conduct as hostile. Powerful countervailing concerns and cultural norms
make the MDC unlikely to assume the risk of an errant decision based
solely on their subjective assessment of a CDC's performance.
It is a bold step for one co-counsel to impugn another's
professionalism in front of their mutual client. The military services'
current policies, at best, provide only oblique guidance that does not aid
counsel in deciding when to take that step and does not account for the
conflicting pressures on the MDC. 35 This has the secondary effect of
masking the ethical problem by underwriting an incompetent or
indiligent CDC's lack of preparation with the government-funded MDC
whose foremost concern is keeping the defense team from failing. The
UCMJ creates a unique co-counsel dynamic that civilian public
defenders do not encounter; therefore, the military service regulations
must unambiguously authorize the MDC to communicate concerns about
their co-counsels' case preparation to their clients. Without such clarity,
MDC remain caught in the vice between the possibilities of an IAC
allegation or a bar complaint from an angry co-counsel, fending for
themselves as they prepare for trial.
III.

ARTICLE 38 OF THE UCMJ AND THE RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
EXACERBATE THIS PROBLEM

Article 38 provides that an accused, although she is entitled to a
military counsel detailed to her defense, may personally request an
individual military counsel of her own selection if such counsel is
"reasonably available." 36 Article 38 further provides that if such a
authorities). Note that in the civilian context, tortious interference by one lawyer against another
lawyer normally involves situations where the tortfeasor is attempting to gain the client's business,
and not a co-counsel representing the same client. Civilian tort jurisprudence therefore may be

inapplicable to this situation, though likely no military attorney would want to personally test this
theory.
35. See Botelho, supra note 29, at 26-28, 29 n.74 (quoting "former Trial Defense Service
Attorney") ("Military defense counsel have the responsibility to walk the line between protecting

the attorney client relationship between the Soldier and his attorney and protecting the system from
clear ineffective assistance of counsel.").
36. UCMJ art. 38(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(3). Each military department promulgates its own
regulations establishing the procedures for detailing MDC and determining whether
individually-requested counsel is "reasonably available." See UCMJ arts. 27(a)(1), 38(b)(7), 10
U.S.C. §§ 827(a)(1), 838(b)(7); see also AR 27-10, supra note 3, paras. 5-7, 6-9 (prescribing
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request for individual military counsel is approved, any previously
detailed military counsel will be excused unless the detailing authority,
"in his sole discretion," allows them to remain on the case. 37 This Article
of the UCMJ expressly states: "The accused is not entitled to be
represented by more than one military counsel." 38
This was not always the case. As originally enacted in 1950, Article
38 read: "Should the accused have counsel of his own selection, the duly
appointed defense counsel, and assistant defense counsel, if any, shall, if
the accused so desires, act as his associate counsel." 3 9 Congress
amended this provision in 1981, providing for excusal of detailed
counsel if the accused obtains military counsel of his own selection and
adding the presumptive restriction on "more than one military counsel"
that still exists today.40
The legislative history shows that Congress and the leadership of
the military services, to include the Court of Military Appeals," were
concerned, inter alia, with the inefficient use of resources when a
servicemember obtained both military counsel of her own selection and
retained her detailed MDC.42 Chief Judge Robinson Everett of the Court
detailing and individual request procedures for the United States Army); U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY,
NAVAL LEGAL SERVS. COMMAND INSTRUCTION 5800.7F, MANUAL JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. paras.
0130-31 (June 26, 2012) (detailing procedures for the United States Department of the Navy); U.S.
DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-201, ADMIN. MIL. JUST. paras. 10.3.1.1, 10.4 (Jan. 18, 2019)
(detailing procedures for the United States Air Force).

37.
38.
39.
(codified
40.
(codified

UCMJ art. 38(b)(6), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(6).
Id.
Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 38, 64 Stat. 107, 120 (1952)
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 838).
Military Justice Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-81, § 4, 95 Stat. 1085, 1088 (1981)
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 838). At the time, the decision to excuse or allow the detailed

MDC to remain on the case resided with the military commander who convened the court-martial.
In 1983, Congress changed this provision to its current language, "the person authorized under

regulations prescribed under [Article 27 of the UCMJ] to detail counsel," as part of a
comprehensive reform of the UCMJ that, among other changes, removed defense counsel from the

direct supervision of the military chain-of-command. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-209, § 3(e)(1), 97 Stat. 1393, 1394 (1983). Notwithstanding that presumption, today many
accused servicemembers receive two detailed MDC for a contested court-martial, especially in
complex trials-however that decision belongs to the detailing authority, not the accused. See, e.g.,
MCO 5800.16-v3, supra note 3, at para. 011002 ("The detailing of assistant defense counsel to
contested and/or complex cases is encouraged.").

41. The Court of Military Appeals was later renamed the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces. The History of the U.S. Army Court of CriminalAppeals, JAGCNET (Apr. 3, 2013, 4:59 PM),
https://www.jagenet.army.mi/ACCA.
42. Hearing on H.R. 4689 to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice Before the Mil.
Pers. and Comp. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Servs., 97th Cong. 21 (1981) [hereinafter
Hearing Report] (statement of Hon. Robinson O. Everett, C.J., United States Court of Military

Appeals) ("[l]t would be nice, of course, to be able to furnish two lawyers. It would be nice to
furnish a lot of other things . .. I just do not think the services have the resources to provide it."); id.
at 50 (statement of Major General Hugh J. Clausen, J. Advocate General of the United States Army)
("The Department of Defense strongly supports the amendment ... pertaining to individual military
counsel. This provision will result in a cost and manpower saving without impairing the rights of
accused service personnel."); id. at 77 (letter of retired General Russell E. Dougherty, United States
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of Military Appeals testified, "[I]f you give the man a choice ... and he
is assigned a counsel of his choice, he really cannot complain if he does
not have two lawyers." 43 The Judge Advocate General of the Army,
Hugh J. Clausen, testified, "[P]roviding the accused with two free
military lawyers is a burden the Government should not be required to
assume except when it is necessary."44
Rules for Courts-Martial 505 and 506 implement Article 38,
excusing detailed MDC unless the appropriate detailing authority elects
to keep them on the case. 45 Currently, regardless of whether an accused
receives one, two, or even three detailed MDC, if she receives the
military counsel she personally chooses, the detailing authority can
terminate the attorney-client relationship for any or all of the detailed
MDC.46 Otherwise, the detailed MDC who have formed an
attorney-client relationship must remain part of the defense team unless
the military judge presiding over the court-martial permits the MDC to
47
withdraw, either for good cause or with the consent of the accused. In
other words, if the accused receives the civilian counsel she personally
chooses, the accused, rather than the detailing authority, decides whether
any or all detailed MDC remain part of the defense team.
This arrangement is unique to the military. In civilian jurisdictions,
where the right to publicly-funded counsel is based on indigence, when a
criminal defendant obtains counsel of his own selection (thus disproving
indigence) the trial court can terminate any prior appointment of
publicly-funded defense counsel.48 The supporters of the 1981 UCMJ
amendments, in the name of efficiency and conservation of resources,
advocated giving military detailing authorities similar discretion to end
Air Force) ("I do not believe there should be any obligation on the part of the government to
provide more than one military counsel."); id. at 96 (letter of Hon. Robinson O. Everett, C.J., United
States Court of Military Appeals) ("The amendments [to Article 38] ... insure that each member
will have competent representation by military counsel free of charge, but at the same time insure
that such representation is being provided at a reasonable cost to the government and that military
legal manpower is being utilized in an economic fashion."). But see id. at 40 (statement of Eugene
R. Fidell, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union) ("[T]he notion that there is something basically
wrong with our statutory scheme because it permits two lawyers in some circumstances, puzzles
me.").

43. Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 50.
45. MCM, supra note 11, R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B)(i), 506(b)(3).
46. Id. 506(b)(3) discussion ("Among the factors that may be considered in the exercise of
discretion [to excuse or permit retention of detailed MDC] are the seriousness of the case, retention
of civilian defense counsel, complexity of legal or factual issues, and the detail of additional trial
counsel [i.e. prosecutors].").
47. Id. 505(d)(2)(B), 506(c).
48. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963); see also JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY §§ 220.55.30, 220.60 ("In any
case in which appointment of counsel has been made under the [Criminal Justice Act] and the court
subsequently finds that the person is financially able to obtain counsel, such appointment should be
terminated.").
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an MDC's attorney-client relationships if a client obtains the military
attorney he wants. 49 Yet Congress left in place a system whereby an
accused can keep multiple detailed MDC and the attorney he wants by
choosing a CDC rather than requesting a particular military counsel.50
In the military, a detailing authority may decide that a case merits a
second defense counsel and detail an assistant MDC to the case.51 The
accused may then hire a CDC, in which case the detailing authority
cannot remove even one of the detailed MDC after an attorney-client
relationship has been formed, even if that case does not require three
attorneys to present an effective defense.5 2 More is not always better; not
only does this present the same concerns about inefficiency that led
Congress to amend Article 38 with regard to individually-requested
military counsel, it exacerbates the potential ethical problem described
above in Part II by ensuring every CDC can be backstopped by at least
one, if not more, MDC. 53
IV.

SOLUTIONS-GIVE MDC AND THEIR

SUPERVISORS THE COVER

AND FLEXIBILITY THEY NEED

Currently, the military services give MDC little specific guidance
for situations when a CDC appears to be failing their mutual client
beyond "talk to the CDC," "talk to your supervisor," and (maybe) "talk
to your client." The supervisors likewise have few guideposts, and
ultimately, the MDC and supervisors must weigh their qualitative
judgment of the CDC's performance against the likelihood it will
damage the relations among counsel and client and expose the MDC to
an accusation of malfeasance. All the while, the MDC still remains part
of the defense team preparing for trial, under the expectation that he can
be held professionally responsible for everything the defense does or
fails to do.
The military services should reduce this uncertainty and
concomitant anxiety by prescribing clear guidance for when an MDC
must communicate to her client when co-counsel's performance is
49. HearingReport, supra note 42, at 50-52 (statement of Major General Hugh J. Clausen, J.
Advocate General of the United States Army).
50. See supratext accompanying notes 46-47. Incidentally, one of the strongest opponents to
the "only one military defense counsel" rule had no quarrel with such a rule when the accused
obtained a CDC. HearingReport, supra note 42, at 73 ("Where civilian counsel is retained, I am not

bothered by providing only one military lawyer.") (letter of Jack B. Zimmerman, Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, appended to the record of the hearing).
51. See sources cited supra note 40.
52. See MCM, supra note 11, R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B), 506(b)(3), 506(c) (providing that, after
the formation of the attorney-client relationship, "detailed defense counsel shall normally be
excused" if the accused is represented by an individual MDC, but not requiring the same procedure
if the accused is represented by a CDC).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44; supra Part II.
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unacceptable. Case law defining when counsel's performance reaches
IAC provides a helpful framework. The hypothetical case of SGT
Jackson, above, illustrates some of the clearest and most likely
situations-failure to investigate, failure to prepare, and failure to meet
deadlines from the court.5 4
In United States v. Gibson," the defense (CDC and MDC together)
failed to identify and follow investigatory leads in the law enforcement
report that would have led to witnesses who could have challenged the
alleged victim's credibility. 56 The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces held that "failure to investigate . . . was a serious oversight
caused by [co-counsels'] failure to carefully read the final CID report"
58
and constituted IAC. 57 In United States v. Scott, a lay volunteer
identified multiple witnesses who may have supported the accused's
alibi defense. 59 Despite presenting alibi as the theory of the defense, the
CDC did not follow up on any information from the volunteer
investigator, "did not prepare [his key witness] or any other witness for
trial," and did not prepare his own client for direct or
cross-examination. 60 In United States v. Boone, 61 the MDC interviewed
three potential presentencing witnesses who could have testified about
his client's rehabilitative potential. 62 Once the accused hired a CDC, the
MDC turned his notes over to the CDC. 63 The CDC did not contact these
witnesses and they did not testify at trial, which the court held
constituted IAC.64 The appellate court also cautioned the MDC:
We recognize the delicate situation military defense counsel confront
when the client exercises his right to civilian defense counsel and also
retains military counsel on the case. However, this case demonstrates
why military counsel must not be lulled into inactivity and complete
deference to their civilian counterpart. The presence of civilian counsel

54. See supra Part I; see also United States v. Brunson, 59 M.J. 41, 43 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(castigating appellate counsel for multiple late filings and noting that counsel risks "compromising
their client's rights and protections" when they fail to comply with court rules). Note that all defense
counsel are equally at fault if the defense team fails to meet court deadlines of which all counsel are
aware.

55. 51 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
56. Id. at 199-200, 202.
57. Id. at 201-02 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)) ("[C]ounsel
has a duty to make reasonable investigations.").

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

24 M.J. 186 (C.M.A. 1987).
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 191.
44 M.J. 742 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
Id. at 743-744.
Id.
Id. at 744, 746.
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does not relieve military defense counsel of their professional and
ethical obligations toward their client.6 5

The phrase "delicate situation" accurately describes the unique
predicament that MDC face, which their counterparts in civilian public
defenders' offices almost never encounter: subjection to professional
consequence for the ineffective performance of the retained counsel
whom they had no choice in selecting. The military services should aid
their MDC in navigating this delicate situation and clearly direct them to
notify their clients when it appears their co-counsel 66 are failing to
adequately investigate or prepare for their cases. This will aid counsel in
fulfilling their ethical obligations, including the duty to "explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." 67 It will also provide reassurance
to the MDC by underwriting their reasonable decisions to communicate
concerns with their clients, reducing their potential exposure to
accusations of wrongful interference by a scorned CDC.68
Even a minor clarifying addition to existing regulations would
significantly reduce the uncertainty present in the current dynamic-for
example, amending the Army Military Justice regulation to read: "If the
military counsel determines that the civilian counsel is conducting
himself or herself contrary to the Army 'Rules of Professional Conduct
for Lawyers' (see AR 27-26) including the duties of competence,
diligence, and communication ... ."69 A more comprehensive solution
would provide a list of situational examples, including those discussed
above (failure to investigate, to talk with witnesses, or to prepare for
witness examinations). 70 Rather than relying on military trial defense
organizations' internally-developed best practices and informal
guidance, this directive should be in publicly-available service
regulations,71 so that CDC, MDC, prosecutors, and even the lay public
can be aware of them.
65. Id. at 746 n.4.
66. While this Article focuses on civilians as lead counsel assisted by MDC, such guidance
would apply as forcefully to situations involving, for example, two military co-counsel, an
individually-requested MDC, and a detailed MDC.
67. AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 1.4(b); accord JAGINST 5803.IE, supra note 17,
encl. 1, r. 1.4(b); AFI 51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r. 1.4(b). This phrase also provides a key
limitation-lack of diligence or communication is not failing to respond to every email or return

every phone call from co-counsel, but a protracted dereliction of counsel's responsibility to the
point that the client cannot meaningfully participate in his defense.

68.

Cf AR 27-26, supra note 17, app. B, r. 5.2(b) ("A subordinate lawyer does not violate the

Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's

reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty."); accord JAGINST 5803.IE,
supra note 17, encl. 1, r. 5.2(c); AFI 51-110, supra note 17, attach. 2, r. 5.2(b).
69. AR 27-10, supra note 3, para. C-2(b)(3) (italicized text indicates proposed addition).
70.

See supra text accompanying notes 54-66.

71. See, e.g., AR 27-10, supra note 3; MCO 5800.16-v3, supra note 3. Alternatively, adding
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Furthermore, Congress should amend Article 38 and the President
72
to give
should amend the implementing Rules for Courts-Martial
accused
an
if
MDC
detailed
remove
to
ability
the
detailing authorities
obtains representation from a CDC. The provision of qualified counsel at
government expense, regardless of indigence, is a positive cornerstone
of military justice. However, if the accused opts for civilian counsel of
his own selection, military detailing authorities should have the same
flexibility they do when the accused opts for military counsel of his own
selection. This would allow the supervisory attorneys in military trial
defense organizations the ability to serve their clients' interests while
73
efficiently managing their personnel. Additionally, it would reduce the
incentive for unscrupulous CDC to shirk their responsibilities to their
clients because they would not be guaranteed a government-funded
MDC to compensate for their ineffectiveness.
This Article describes ethical dilemmas that are practically
nonexistent in civilian criminal defense practice but, thankfully, are also
uncommon in military criminal justice. Nonetheless, the unique system
by which accused servicemembers obtain and retain court-martial
defense attorneys sets the conditions for some CDC's dereliction of their
professional responsibility, which the military services' current guidance
both facilitates and obfuscates. In the end, the accused servicemembers
paying for this deficient representation are the ones who suffer the most.
Clear direction and revised policy will mitigate the likelihood of such
deficiency, elevate the quality of the court-martial defense bar, and
thereby enhance the fairness of military justice.

such a provision to the services' respective Rules of Professional Conduct would be sufficient; see
sources cited supra note 17.

72. The President establishes the rules of procedure and evidence for courts-martial through
executive order. See UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836.
73. If nothing else, the statute and rules should allow a detailing authority discretion to excuse
one MDC in situations where he originally detailed multiple MDC based on her assessment of the
case. This would also reinforce the legislative decree of Article 38, that one MDC is an entitlement,
but any additional MDC is discretionary. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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